The "semantic" articles of Autrecourt's condemnation : new proposals for an interpretation of the articles 1, 30, 31, 35, 57 and 58 by Thijssen, J.M.M.H.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/105678
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
EX L i B R I S  
UNI  V E R S I T A T I S  
N O V I O M A G E N S i S
THE “SEMANTIC” ARTICLES OF 
AUTRECOURT’S CONDEMNATION.
NEW PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERPRETATION 
OF THE ARTICLES 1, 30, 31, 35, 57 and 581
In our current picture of 14th-century philosophy Nicholas o f Autrecourt 
still holds a somewhat uneasy position. Historians of medieval philosophy 
generally have credited Autrecourt, more than any other medieval thinker, 
with a critical attitude. Autrecourt is critical o f the possibility o f knowing 
causal relations; he is critical o f our knowledge of substances through their 
accidents; he criticizes those people who keep on reading Aristotle and his 
Commentator until senility sets in, and who attack him, that is Nicholas, the 
friend of truth, when he blows his trumpet to wake the sleeping from their 
sleep.2 However, historians still widely diverge when it comes to an evaluation 
and appreciation of this critical attitude. Should Autrecourt be considered a 
medieval Hume or Kant, an extreme Ockhamist, or a confused eclectic, to 
mention only a few of the labels that have been used to describe his thought.3
At least one of the dominant factors that account for this situation, is the 
circumstance that any discussion of Autrecourt’s thought tended to focus on 
the events at the Arts Faculty at Paris in the years 1340-1347 and 
consequently on the assumed association of his thought with that of William 
of Ockham and John Buridan.4
(1) I wish to thank Prof. John Murdoch for his helpful suggestions and encouragment. 
Research for this paper was made possible through a fellowship from the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Sciences.
(2 ) See T hijssen (1 9 8 7 )  for a recent attempt o f a reinterpretation of Autrecourt’s views on 
causality, and for some of the literature on Autrecourt. A more extensive bibliography is 
provided in N icolaus von A utrecourt (1 9 8 8 ) , lxv-lxviii. For the text paraphrased here cf. 
N icolaus von A utreco urt (1 9 8 8 ) , 84 , article 37 . Cf. la liste des ouvrages cités in fine ( N D L R ) .
(3 ) The Forschungsgeschichte is neatly outlined in N icolaus von A utrecourt  (1 9 8 8 ) , lii-lix.
(4 ) See for example S cott (1 9 7 1 ) , M oody  (1 9 7 5 )  and more recently B ottin (1 9 8 2 ).
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It was not until quite recently that we have come to see—due to the studies 
of Courtenay and Tachau—that the several “relevant” documents from this 
period in reality address a whole series of crises and not just one issue, that is 
to say, the controversy at Paris over Ockham’s thought.5
In the light of the new, and to my opinion correct, interpretation of the 
events at the Arts Faculty at Paris, the condemnation of Nicholas of 
Autrecourt in 1346 and 1347 is no longer perceived as the final stage of the 
battle against Ockhamism.6 This does not mean that the relation of the 
thought of Autrecourt and Ockham, or of Autrecourt and Buridan has now 
been clarified. It only means that a study of Autrecourt’s thought should not 
start from any assumptions about the existence of such relations.
To my mind there are still too many aspects o f A utrecourt’s thought that 
need to be clarified, before an attem pt can be made to determine his position 
on the map of 14th-century philosophy. The aspect to which I shall turn 
concerns the list of articles condemned in 1346, and especially those six articles 
that have a bearing upon medieval semantic discussions.
Some of the ‘semantic’ articles have received scholarly attention in the 
recent and not so recent past. Lappe, for example, in the introduction to his 
edition of Autrecourt’s Letters and condemned articles showed himself 
puzzled to such extent by one of the articles that will be discussed here that he 
qualified it as sinnlos without its proper context.7 More recently Tachau 
ingeniously tried to argue that the very same article reflects London and 
Oxford debates on certain topics, and that Autrecourt’s condemnation should 
be seen in connection with the introduction of the “new English theology” to 
Paris.8
In those instances where an article has already received scholarly attention, 
I will limit myself to a presentation and defence o f the interpretation that in 
my view makes most sense. In other instances I will have to be more elaborate. 
In any case one should keep in mind that A utrecourt’s own writings are of no 
particular help in dealing with the ‘semantic’ articles. Perhaps he did cover 
some of the problems to which these articles refer in his Commentary on the 
Sentences, but, since this work has not yet been identified, or was never even
(5) Courtenay/T achau (1982) and Courtenay (1984).
(6) Courtenay/Tachau (1982), 53. Although Courtenay’s and Tachau’s interpretation o f  
the events at the Arts Faculty seem to have found general acceptance, there still are very 
recent studies that display the older perception, e.g. in the introduction to the new edition and 
German translation o f  Autrecourt’s Letters. In this introduction (N icolaus von A u trecou rt 
(1988), 1 n. 79) Perler asks him self the question whether the statute o f  1340 should be 
understood as a reproof o f  the extreme Ockhamist Autrecourt, or as an Ockhamist reproof o f  
the anti-Okhamist Autrecourt. This status quaestionis is the more surprising since Perler 
elsewhere in his introduction cites with approval the studies o f  Courtenay and Tachau.
(7) Lappe (1908), 5. He is referring to the article “quod Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid”.
(8) Tachau (1988), 352-357. The term “new English theology” has been coined by 
Courtenay, Courtenay (1987), esp. 250-307.
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written, we will have to find texts o f other medieval authors to reconstruct the 
14th-century debates on these issues and to give some understanding of their 
broader significance.9
In order to facilitate discussion, I have put the articles in an order different 
from that which they had in the edition.
Article 1 and the semantic debate on “homo est animal” .
(1 ) “Dixi et scripsi, quod hec propositio ‘Homo est animal’ non est necessaria 
secundum fidem, non attendens pro tunc connexionem necessariam predictorum 
terminorum— Falsam et revocandam.”
“I have said and written that this proposition ‘man is an animal’ is not necessary 
according to faith, at that time not paying attention to the necessary connection 
of the foresaid terms.—This false and should be recanted.”
This article is clearly connected with the 13th-century discussion of the 
sophism “man is an animal” that has attracted considerable attention not only 
from medieval thinkers, but also from modern scholars.10 The discussion 
concentrates on the question whether the proposition “man is an animal” is 
(necessarily) true, even when no man exists.
This question is, of course, primarly concerned with the relation between 
language and things: does the truth of a proposition require the actual 
existence of the things referred to? M ore specifically, this and related sophisms 
served to clarify the relation between significatio and suppositio and the nature 
of predication by examining the verification of propositions that concern 
empty classes.11 If the objects referred to by the terms of a proposition are 
(temporarily) out of existence, is this proposition then true or false? It is not 
hard to see that the answer to this question to a large extent comes to depend 
upon the domain of denotation one wishes to admit.
The great diversity of opinion in this m atter is reflected by a 13th-century 
author who exclaimed that there were as many opinions as there were authors: 
quot capita tot sentencie,12 Here I will only present the two extremes of the 
whole gamut of positions.
According to one extreme position—represented among others by Roger 
Bacon and Boethius of Dacia—the proposition “man is an animal” is false 
when no man exists. A proposition can only be verified for a suppositum that is 
really extant. Verification by means of the essence signified or connoted is,
(9) The fact that none of the articles that will be discussed here stem from one of 
Autrecourt’s texts that are still extant has probably induced Perler to put these articles in the 
category “Missdeutungen und böswillige Interpretation”, N icolaus von A utrecourt  (1988), 
xxxiv. Perler neglects, however, to document this qualification.
(10) Some of the literature relevant to this issue will be mentioned in the following 
footnotes.
(11) E bbesen (1979) and P inborg  (1971).
(12) L ewry (1984), 423.
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according to Bacon, not possible, because the term “m an” has lost its 
signification when no man exists.13
According to the opposite position, the proposition “man is an animal” is 
true, even when no man exists. Actual existence in this world is not required 
for the truth of a proposition about natural realities. The truth of the 
proposition is guaranteed by the necessary relation obtaining between subject 
(“m an”) and predicate (“animal”), which is assumed to exist somewhere else 
(for example in the mind). The truth of the proposition can be linked to 
existence in the conceptual order, to an esse quidditativum, to an esse 
habitude, to mention only a few of the possibilities that were put forward in 
the 13th century.14
In the background of the two solutions to the sophism “man is an animal” 
outlined here, there lies a fundamentally different conception of supposition. 
In particular this sophism is a witness to what De Rijk has coined “ the 
hesitation of medieval logicians between the domains of connotation and 
denotation.” 15 Besides, the different solutions also reflect two different views 
of the function of the copula “est” in the proposition “man is an animal” .
Both approaches to the copula “is” are nicely illustrated by William of 
Sherwood’s distinction between esse habituate and esse actuale. If  we take “ is” 
in the proposition “man is an animal” according to esse habituate, the 
proposition is true, even when no man exists. It is just a case of a superior 
term (“animal”) being predicated of an inferior term (“m an”). If, on the other 
hand, “is” is taken in the sense of esse actuale, the proposition “man is an 
animal” implies the actual existence of a man (“man is”).16
With this background information in mind, let us now return to the first of 
the condemned articles of Autrecourt. From  the text of this article it can be 
inferred that Autrecourt at one point or another had held the view that the 
proposition “man is an animal” is not necessarily true according to faith, since 
he did not pay attention to the necessary connection of the subject- and
(13) Bacon does allow that the term that refers to a non-existent object receives 
signification anew. This second signification, however, will be equivocal in relation to the first 
one. For a discussion of Bacon’s views and the relevant texts see B raak huis (1977) and 
de L ibera (1981).
(14) See L ewry (1981) and P inborg  (1971). Another solution, which does not fit in easily 
into the classification presented here, grounds the truth of the proposition “man is an animal” 
on the eternity of the species, whose members always have an existence somewhere in the 
world (Siger of Brabant; Robert Grosseteste).
(15) It is not the place here to elaborate this point further. See D e R ijk (1970) and (1982), 
and P inborg  (1971).
(16) Sherwoods’ views have been discussed in B raak huis (1977). Other medieval thinkers 
made a distinction between an atemporal esse quidditativum and an esse existentie and would 
say that “man is an animal” is not linked to the existence o f a man because both forms of esse 
are external to one another, L ewry (1981), 246. Note, that by making his distinction, 
Sherwood in fact represents an intermediary position between those thinkers who claim that 
the truth of “man is an animal” requires real existence and those authors who claim that it 
does not.
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predicate-term. If  the connection of the terms is not considered, the 
proposition “man is an animal” would be false when no man exists.
The relevance of the condemnation of A utrecourt’s stance to the 13th- 
century debate on “man is an animal” is not a mere product of an historian’s 
imagination. It has also been noticed by Marsilius of Inghen, although 
without naming Autrecourt explicitly.
Let us turn to Marsilius’ text. In Question 29 of Book I o f his Questions on 
the Prior Analytics, Marsilius discusses whether the proposition “man is an 
animal” is necessary.17 Among the arguments in favor of a positive answer, he 
there mentions in the same breath the authority of “a cardinal elsewhere” and 
“ the article of Paris that states that it is an error to say that ‘man is an animal’ 
is not necessary” . Marsilius concludes that “ therefore this proposition is 
simpliciter necessary” .18
From  the phrasing of the argument it is quite clear that Marsilius is 
referring to two separate things: the authority of “a cardinal elsewhere” , and 
an article of Paris.19 Marsilius’ summary of the Parisian article leaves no 
doubt that he must have had in mind the first article of A utrecourt’s 
condemnation. The cardinalis alibi has to be identified with cardinal Robert 
Kilwardby, who in 1277 (when not yet a cardinal, but an archbishop) 
condemned thirty theses in the fields of grammar, logic and natural 
philosophy at Oxford.20
Among the condemned logical theses is one thesis declaring that necessary 
truth depends upon the persistence of the subject.21 From  other texts it is clear 
that this thesis is related to the 13th-century debate over the sophism “man is 
an animal” .22 Kilwardby himself held the view that “man is an animal” is
(17) M a r s i l iu s  o f  Inghen. Quaestiones super libros Analyticorum Priorum (1516), I q. 29, 
f. 15vb: “Utrum hec sit necessaria: ‘homo est animal’” It lies beyond the scope o f this article 
to discuss Marsilius’ own views on this issue.
(18) M arsilius of I n g h e n , op. cit. f. 15vb: “Arguitur quod sic... Item, arguitur auctoritate 
cardinalis alibi. Item, arguitur articulo Parisiensi dicente sic: quod dicere hominem esse 
animal non est necesse: error; igitur ista (scil. “homo est animal”) simpliciter est necessaria.”
(19) Additional proof of this contention can be found on f. 46ra of this text, in the section 
Ad rationes: “Ad auctoritatem cardinalis et articulum dicitur quod intellexerunt ultimam 
conclusionem, puta quod est necessaria secundum suppositionem naturalem.”
(20) L e w r y  (1981) and see also note 21.
(21) D e n i f l e /C h a t e la in  (1889) I, 558, no. 474: “Item quod veritas cum necessitate tantum 
est cum constancia subjecti.”
(22) See Ebbesen/P inborg (1970) and L e w r y  (1981). The very same cardinal Kilwardby is 
also quoted by John Buridan in a passage that has been misread as a reference to the 
condemned article o f  Autrecourt, John Buridan, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum 
(1518), IV, q. 8, f. 18vb: “Et forte ille cardinalis erat illius opinionis (scil. quod esse et non esse 
sunt quidam modi diversi accidentales accidentes essentie), qui misit bullam quod ista 
propositio “hom o est animal” vel etiam ista propositio “equus est animal” est necessaria 
propter inclusionem terminorum et esset vera, quamvis Deus annihilaret omnes equos.” 
M ichael (1985) conjectures that Buridan is citing “die Bulle des ‘cardinalis albus’, d.h. die den 
Prozess gegen Autrecourt beschliessende Bulle von Kardinal Curty, Zisterzienser und Bischof 
von A lb i...” However, Buridan’s text— also as cited by Michael— reads “cardinalis” and not
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necessarily true even when no man exists. Kilwardby’s stance may not only be 
inferred from the condemned thesis; it seems also to be represented in the 
sophism “Every man necessarily is an animal” (Omnis homo de necessitate est 
animal) that is attributed to him.23 Kilwardby defends the view that the truth 
of the proposition is based upon existence in the conceptual order. The term 
“m an” brings to mind the concept o f animal.
Finally, something has to be said about the possible background of the 
condemnation of this particular article. For one thing, the authorities may 
have felt that Autrecourt’s position in the semantic debate over “man is an 
animal” resembled too much the position that had been condemned at Oxford 
in 1277. But even so, one can still ask why this position was considered an 
error.
A utrecourt’s own writings do not provide an answer to this question, but 
from the texts of his near and not-so-near contemporaries we can infer that 
the semantic debate over “man is an animal” clearly had a theological 
connection: the doctrine of the incarnation, more specifically the Christologi- 
cal problem connected with this doctrine: whether Christ in the three days 
after his death and before his resurrection may still be called a man.24
Already in the 13th-century Roger Bacon had written that, precisely 
because of ignorance in regard to the semantic problem we have outlined here 
“ the multitude holds that dead Caesar is a man, that a dead man is an animal, 
and that Christ was a man during the three days in the tom b ...” .25
For the 14th-century we have to turn again to a text of Marsilius of Inghen. 
Question 13 of Book III o f Marsilius’ Commentary on the Sentences is devoted
“cardinalis albi”! Besides, we do not know anything about cardinal Curty’s views, whereas we 
do know Kilwardby’s views on this issue.
(23) The text has been partially edited in Ebbesen/P inborg (1970), 37-40. See esp. p. 39: 
“Unde dico (f. 9vb) quod hec est vera ‘omnis hom o de necessitate est animal’ et ilia ‘homo est 
animal’ nullo homine existente, sicut ostendebat quedam ratio, quoniam ad veritatem 
propositionis in naturali materia non exigitur existentia extremorum actu. Cum igitur 
intellectus hominis et animalis naturaliter sint coherentes, manifestum quod sive homo sit sive 
non sit, dumm odo hec vox ‘hom o’ hominem significet, simpliciter in ipso intelligitur animal. 
Et ideo nullo homine existente hec est vera ‘hom o est animal’ et ‘omnis hom o de necessitate 
est animal’ ...” See Lewry (1981), 246 and (1984), 422-423 and d e  Libera (1981), 216-220 for a 
discussion o f  Kilwardby’s views. It is still uncertain who have been the targets o f  Kilwardby’s 
condemnation. Roger Bacon seems to be a likely candidate. In any case he represents an 
opinion that is very similar to the one considered erroneous at Oxford. But see Braakhuis 
( 1985), esp. 120-121. Thomas Aquinas may have been another target. The matter has been 
more fully investigated and documented in a paper by Prof. Braakhuis. I hope he will soon  
publish his interesting results.
(24) The 12th-century developments in the doctrine of the incarnation have been neatly 
outlined in N ielsen (1982). From this study one gains the impression that Christ’s death had 
not yet been a major problem in the 12th century.
(25) R oger Bacon (1988), 87.
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to the problem whether Christ in the three days was truly man, as he had been 
during his life.26
The Question is divided into two main sections (articuli). The first treats 
the assumption made in the Question, namely that in the three days of Christ’s 
death the flesh and the soul remain united to the W ord.27 The second section, 
which will concern us here, is devoted to the problem itself, that is to say, the 
problem whether Christ in the three-day period of his death was truly m an.28
Marsilius opens this section with a review of the three major positions 
dealing with this problem: the position of Hugh of St. Victor, according to 
whom Christ remains a man even in the three days after his cruxifiction; the 
position of Peter the Lombard, who, although for different reasons, also 
maintains that Christ remains a man; and finally the position common to the 
School of Paris (communis schole Parisiensis), namely that Christ during the 
three days was not a m an.29 Already in the course of the 13th-century this 
opinion was referred to as the received view.30
The Parisian opinion was based upon the assumption that Christ’s 
humanity needs two requirements, and that if Christ fails to meet only one of
(26) The full title of Question 13 reads as follows: “Tertiodecimo queritur circa 
distinctiones XXI et XXII et ultimo circa passionem, utrum sicut in triduo utraque pars 
essentialis Christi hominis Verbo mansit unita, sic in eodem Christus fuerit vere homo sicut 
fuit in vita,” M arsilius of  In g h e n , In. Sent. (1501), III q. 13, f. 438rb.
(27) M arsilius of I n g h e n , op. cit., f. 438rb: “Que questio supponit quod in triduo tam caro 
quam anima mansit unita Verbo .../f. 439rb/... In hac questione sunt duo articuli. Primus erit 
de supposito”. The text of this first section runs till f. 442rb.
(28) M arsilius of In g h e n , op. cit., f. 442rb: “Quantum ad secundum articulum restat videre 
de quesito, scilicet utrum in eodem triduo Christus fuerit vere homo sicut fuit in vita”. This 
section covers ff. 442rb-445vb.
(29) M arsilius of I n g h e n , op. cit., f. 442rb-va: “Pro quo sciendum est primo quod de hoc 
proposito sunt tres modi dicendi. Primus est venerabilis Hugonis.../f. 442va/ . ..Hec ergo 
opinio... concedit quod Christus post mortem mansit homo... Secundus modus dicendi est 
Magistri... Consequenter dicit Magister quod fuerit homo in triduo... Tertius modus est 
communis schole Parisiensis, dicens quod Christus in triduo non fuit homo.”
(30) See Bonaventure, In Sent. (1934-1964), II d. 44 dub. 3: “Aliter est, quod Christus fuit 
hom o in triduo” . This was one o f  the eight theses o f  Peter the Lombard that were not 
followed by the Parisian masters: “In his octo positionibus communiter doctores Parisienses 
non sequuntur M agistrum ...” (Cited in d e Libera (1981), 231 n. 46). See also Thomas 
A quinas, Scriptum super Sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi (1929-1947), III d. 21 q. 1 art. 1, 
who presents the same outline o f  positions as Marsilius and remarks: “Et ideo omnes moderni 
tenent, quod Christus in triduo non fuerit hom o.” And finally R ichard F ishacre, although an 
oponent o f  the “Parisian school” , In. Sent. I ll  d. 22, edited in Pelster (1949), 272: “Hie 
queritur an in illo tempore fuit hec vera: Deus est homo. Et patet quod Magister sentit quod 
sic. M ulti autem modernorum sentiunt quod non fuerit homo in tempore illo.” Dissenters 
from the “Parisian view” were Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus o f  Cornwall, Pelster 
(1949). The authorship o f  Cornwall’s Commentary on the Sentences is discussed in Raedts 
(1987). He has also made it plausible that Richard Rufus o f  Cornwall is only one o f  the 
authors attacked by Bacon precisely because o f  his stance with regard to the question o f  
Christ’s death; Ebbesen/P inborg (1970), 40-44. For the relevant passages in Bacon’s 
Compendium studii theologiae and their English translation, see now Roger Bacon (1988), 87 
1. 14-31 and 106, 1. 33-108.
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them, he should not be considered man in the three days of his death. The two 
prerequisites for Christ’s humanity are the union of body and soul, which is 
common to all human beings, and the union of humanity (humanitas) and 
divinity ( divinitas! deltas ), which is specific to Christ. Now, all medieval 
thinkers agreed that the unity of God and the human body and soul of Christ 
was never dissolved. The union of body and soul, however, was dissolved by 
Christ’s death, and for this reason the “Parisian School” maintained that 
Christ cannot be called man in the three days between his death and 
resurrection.31
Marsilius himself also subscribes to the view of the “Parisian School” . The 
connection between the issue of Christ’s humanity and the semantic debate of 
“man is an animal” comes into the open when he deals with one of the 
arguments against the “Parisian School” . According to this counterargument 
Christ can be called man in the three days. It relies partly on what we find in 
the condemned article of Autrecourt.
The argument runs as follows. In the three days Christ was Christ, and 
therefore he was a man. The conclusion holds because you are arguing from a 
lower-level term (“Christ”) to a higher-level term (“m an”). The antecedent 
“Christ is Christ” holds true for two reasons. Firstly, the same is predicated of 
itself. Secondly, according to the Parisian article, the proposition “man is an 
animal” is necessarily true; so, the more so the proposition “Christ is 
Christ” .32 The purport of this argument is to prove that the truth of these two 
propositions does not require the existence of a man or of Christ respectively.
(31) Peter the Lombard and his School, on the other hand, maintained that Christ is unlike 
any other human being. So, although the union of body and soul is dissolved, Christ would 
still be called a man because of the union of God and the body and soul of Christ remain 
intact, even during Christ’s death. A very acute and early formulation of the “Parisian 
School” is given by Praepositinus, L an d g r a f  (1947), 147, n. 159 (the punctuation is mine): 
“Alii sunt, qui dicunt quod non fuit homo, dicentes quod ad hoc, quod purus homo sit homo, 
unum tantum exigitur, scilicet unio anime ad carnem. Sed ad hoc quod Christus sit homo, duo 
exiguntur, scilicet unio humanitatis ad Deum et unio anime ad carnem. Et quia facilius est 
destruere quam construere, dicunt quod < quando > una illarum fuit soluta, scilicet unio 
anime ad carnem, tunc non fuit homo. Ad hoc enim ut sit homo albus, duo exiguntur: ut sit 
homo et ut sit albus. Sed ad hoc ut non sit homo albus, sufficit ut unum removeatur. Et hoc 
nobis placet” . Marsilius’ summary o f the views of the “Parisian School” seems to be accurate, 
op. cit., f. 443ra: “Correlarie (scii, correlarium tertie conclusionis) sequitur quod Christus non 
debet dici fuisse homo, eo quod anima sua fuit ei unita, que erat homo... Correlarium (scii, 
quarte conclusionis): Christus non ex eo in triduo dicitur fuisse homo, quia partes que fuerunt 
humanitatis, divise ab invicem, manserunt unitate deitate. Patet, quia per conclusionem hoc 
non sufficit ad hoc quod Christus dicatur vel sit homo. Ex his infertur conclusio responsalis 
cum communi schola Parisiensis quod Christus in triduo non fuit homo. Probatur, quia si 
fuisset homo, hoc vel esset ex eo quod anima, que est proprie homo, mansit ei unita—et hoc 
non per correlarium tertie conclusionis—vel ex eo quod ambe partes humanitatem nate 
constituere manserunt assumpte. Et hoc non per correlarium quarte conclusionis.”
(32) M arsilius of In g h e n , op. cit., f. 439ra: “Octavo: Christus in triduo fuit Christus; ergo 
homo. Consequentia tenet, quia arguitur ab inferiori ad superius. Antecedens patet: primo,
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Another, even earlier reference that clearly connects this condemned article 
to the theological debate of Christ’s death, is given in the Commentary on the 
Sentences of Andreas de Novo Castro (Neufchateau).33
From  Marsilius’ and Andreas’ references we may conclude that medieval 
thinkers saw a connection between the semantic debate of “man is an animal” 
and the doctrine of Christ’s death. Theological considerations with respect to 
the doctrine of Christ’s death may well have played a role in the 
condemnation of Autrecourt’s first article, but we can in no way yet determine 
exactly which considerations.
Articles 30, 31, 35, 57 and 58.
The remaining five “semantic” articles have by far attracted most scholarly 
attention. The direction of the research has been set by Elie’s pioneer-study on 
the complexe significabile.M He had tried to argue that Autrecourt’s position 
with regard to the complexe significabile, as reflected in these articles, 
resembles the position of Gregory of Rimini on this issue, and that 
consequently Autrecourt had been serving as a kind of scapegoat for the 
opinions of his “m aster” .35 Although Elie’s thesis has come under attack, the 
net result of it has been, that in all subsequent studies these five articles were 
considered to address one issue: the complexe significabile.2’6 In my opinion, 
however, only articles 31, 57 and 58 are directly connected with the debate on 
the complexe significabile, and then in a way that has not been perceived 
earlier. Articles 30 and 35 address another issue. I will first propose an 
interpretation of these articles.
Articles 30 and 35: the significate o f  contradictories.
(30) “Item dixi in quadam disputatione, quod contradictoria ad invicem idem
significant.—Falsam”37
quia in ea predicatur idem de se, qua nulla est verior, ut dicit Boethius; secundo, quia articulus 
Parisiensis dicit quod hec est necessaria: ‘homo est animal’, multo fortius ista: ‘Christus est 
Christus’.” We need not go into Marsilius’ answer to this counterargument. It has been 
transcribed and translated in Bos (1981), 250-251 in connection with a discussion of Marsilius’ 
theory of suppositio naturalis. In Marsilius’ solution of this counterargument, there occurs yet 
another reference to the “articulus Parisiensis”. Bos (1981), 252 n. 69 wrongly assumed that 
Marsilius was referring to Tempier’s list of condemned articles of 1277, and consequently was 
not able to identify Marsilius’ reference.
(33) A ndreas d e  Novo C astro , In. Sent. prol. q. 3, f. 14rb: “ A d  probationem dicetur quod 
articulus quod condemnat quod hec non sit necessaria secundum fidem ‘homo est animal’, est 
enim necessaria, quia Christus resurgens ex mortuis, iam non moritur...” I am most grateful 
to Prof. Katherine Tachau for providing me with this transcription.
(34) Elie (1937), esp. 37-40.
(35) E lie (1937), 37-38. In N icolaus von A utrecourt  (1988), xli Perler still considers this 
interpretation as a serious possibility.
(36) See for example P aq u£ (1970), 198-232 and T ac ha u  (1988), 353-357.
(37) N icolaus von A utrecourt  (1988), 82.
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“Again, I have said in some disputation that contradictories signify the same 
thing.—This is false.”
(35) “Item quodpropositiones ‘Deus est’, ‘Deus non est’penitus idem significant, 
licet alio modo.—Falsam.”38
“Again, that the propositions ‘God exists’, ‘God does not exist’ signify entirely 
the same thing, albeit in a different way.—This is false.”
With regard to an understanding of the theses 30 and 35 Elie briefly alluded 
to the signification of syncategorematic terms.39 And indeed, it is within the 
context o f the theory o f syncategorematic terms that both articles should be 
interpreted. In general syncategorematic words are all those words that are 
not categorematic, i.e. all those words that cannot be used alone as a subject- 
or predicate-term, such as conjunctions, adverbs, quantifiers, modal terms and 
prepositions.40
Although it may vary from author to author what notion of syncategorema- 
ta is employed and which non-categorematic words were expressly treated 
among their syncategoremata, two persistent themes are im portant for our 
account.41 First, syncategoremata are generally characterized as words whose 
signification is incomplete or as words that do not signify anything at all.42 
Secondly, the adverb "non” from the very beginning in the 13th-century 
became a prominent member of the syncategoremata.43
In the light of the foregoing, it is not difficult to reconstruct the reasoning 
behind thesis 35. The term “non” in the proposition “Deus non est” does not 
have a signification of its own, and for this reason “Deus non est” and “Deus 
est” signify the same, that is Deus. Although “non” is not significative 
(significative), it does, of course, affect the meaning of the proposition, and 
this fact is exactly expressed in the clue "..., licet alio modo”.
(38) N icolaus von  A utreco urt  (1988), 84. It should be mentioned, perhaps superfluously, 
that article 59 (Item quod est transitus de contradictorio in contradictorium sine mutatione reali 
cuiuscunque intrinsice) does not belong to this group, but is connected with discussions that 
relate to Book V of Aristotle’s Physics. See also W illiam  of O ck h am , Expositio in librum 
Predicament orum Aristotelis (1978), 300.
(39) E lie (1937), 39. Unfortunately his remarks passed unnoticed.
(40) K retzm ann  (1982), esp. 211-213.
(41) The different approaches to syncategorematic words have extensively been analysed in 
B raak huis (1979) and (1981).
(42) See for example the formulation of William of Ockham, Summa logicae (1974), pars I 
cap. 4, 15: “Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent significationem... syncategorema 
proprie loquendo nihil significat, sed magis additum alteri facit ipsum aliquid significare sive 
facit ipsum pro aliquo vel aliquibus modo determinato supponere vel aliud officium circa 
categorema exercet.” And again in the Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis (1978), 
378: “Immo etiam isto modo signa universalia et particularia, et universaliter omnia 
syncategoremata— sive sint nomina large accipiendo nomina, sive verba, si quae sint talia, sive 
adverbia, sive quaecumque aliae partes orationis—non sunt significativae; et hoc, quia nullius 
rei determinatae intellectum faciunt nisi coniunctae cum aliis.”
(43) See Braakhuis (1979), 141, 222, 265, 311, 317, 357 for the treatment o f  “non” as a 
syncategorematic word by Roger Bacon, Johannes Pagus, Petrus Hispanus, William o f  
Sherwood, Nicholas o f  Paris and Henry o f  Ghent respectively. Cf. now also Spruyt (1989).
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The interpretation finds support in the following passage, quoted from the 
S o ph ism ata  of John Buridan, where he discusses the signification of the copula 
est,44
According to Buridan est is a syncategorematic term. W hat makes this 
passage interesting for us, however, is that the examples given by Buridan all 
contain syncategorematic terms, like omnis, nullus, and ...non.
“Unde non sunt aliae res quae capiuntur conceptu correspondente isti orationi
'Deus est Deus’ et isti ‘Deus non est Deus’ et isti ‘Omnis Deus est Deus’ et isti
‘Nullus Deus est Deus’ et isti termino simplici ‘Deus’. Sed aliter et aliter illa res
concipitur, scilicet complexe vel incomplexe, affirmative vel negative. ”4S
Article 30 should, in my view, be read as a generalization of the point that 
has been made in article 35 with the help of the example ‘‘Deus est”. For one 
way to create contradictories is with the help of the sign of negation non. Or, 
as Aristotle puts it, a contradiction is the affirmation and the negation of the 
same thing.46 I suspect that it is exactly this contention, that made some 
medieval thinkers maintain that contradictories do refer to the same substrate 
and even have to refer to the same substrate, for otherwise there would not be 
a contradiction.47
According to one recent interpretation, advanced by Tachau, the articles 30 
and 35 are somehow connected with W odeham’s views on the complexe 
significabile.48 I think, however, that the views proposed in the two articles 
and the complexe significabile are mutually exclusive. According to adherents 
of the complexe significabile, the significate of “Deus est” would be “Deum 
esse”, whereas the significate of “Deus non est” would be “Deum non esse”. 
One of the reasons for introducing an entity like the complexe significabile is 
exactly that, according to its adherents, other thinkers do not know how to 
distinguish between propositions like “homo est animal” and “homo non est 
animal”, or, for that matter, between “Deus est” and “Deus non est”.
This clearly comes to the open in a Question of Adam of W odeham that is 
devoted to the complexe significabile.4'9 As is well known, Adam Wodeham 
was an adherent of the theory of the complexe significabile before Gregory of 
Rimini.50 In one of the sections Wodeham deals with arguments of Walter
(4 4 ) This passage has also been quoted by P a q u£ (1 9 7 0 ) , 199 , although in a different 
context.
(4 5 )  Jo h a nnes B u r id a n u s , Sophismata (1 9 7 7 ) , cap. 1, 33 .
(4 6 )  A ristotle, De Interpretatione, 17a 3 2 -3 6 .
(4 7 ) See again W illiam  of O ck h am , Summa logicae (1 9 7 4 ) , 103 1. 1 2 7 -1 0 4  1. 1: “Incomplexa 
autem contradictoria sunt ilia quorum unum significat aliquid vel aliqua affirmative et aliud 
significat precise illud vel illa negativa, nihil affirmative significando. Sicut ‘homo’ significat 
omnes homines affirmative et ‘non-homo’ significat eosdem homines negative, nihil terminate 
vel finite affirmative significando.”
(4 8 )  T achau  (1 9 8 8 ) , 355 .
(4 9 ) The question has been edited by G al (1 9 7 7 )  and is part of Wodeham’s Commentary 
on the Sentences. Lectura secunda', GAl (1 9 7 7 ) , 71 and also C o u r te n a y  (1 9 7 8 ) , 2 1 0 -2 1 4 .
(5 0 )  Wodeham’s theory is discussed in T ac ha u  (1 9 8 7 )  and (1 9 8 8 ) , 3 0 3 -3 1 0 .
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Chatton, who had argued against the complexe significabile. Wodeham replies 
Chatton that, by denying the complexe significabile, one is no longer able to 
distinguish the proposition “Deus est Deus” from “Deus non est Deus”:
"... Volo igitur quod in anima istius simul sint istae duae propositiones ‘Deus est 
Deus’, 'Deus non est Deus’. Ad formationem unius causabitur assensus, ad 
formationem alterius causabitur dissensus; et si non ipsis complexis— quod esset 
propositum principale— igitur eidem penitus, scilicet Deo. Et confirmatur: quia 
contradictoria— etiam per istum (scii. Chatton)— significant omnino idem, aliter 
non essent, ut dicit, contradictoria. ”51
Note that the last sentence seems to imply that the view on the signification 
of contradictories expressed here, was a commonly accepted one; it was even 
employed by Chatton!52
The passage cited above perhaps also provides us with a key to an 
understanding of the condemnation of articles 30 and 35. Theologians may 
have picked up the idea—which we have seen Wodeham employ against 
adversaries of the complexe significabile—that Autrecourt at least gives the 
impression of not distinguishing the proposition “God exists” from “God 
does not exist” . I do not believe that the Church authorities went so far as to 
misconstrue A utrecourt’s position as stating that God does not exist, for then, 
his thesis 35 would undoubtedly have been qualified as hereticum, instead of 
merely falsum.
The articles 31, 57 and 58 and the discussion o f the complexe significabile.
(31) “Item dixi in quadam disputatione, quod Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid.— 
Falsam et scandalosam prout verba sonant.”53
“Again, I have said in a certain disputation that God and creature are not 
something.—This is false and scandalous as far as the words are taken at face 
value.”
(57) “Item quod Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid.—Falsum et scandalosum prout 
iacet.”SA
“Again, that God and creature are not something.—This is false and scandalous 
as it stands.”
(58) “Item quod significabile complexe per istud complexum ‘Deus et creatura 
distinguntur’ nihil est.— Falsum et scandalosum. ”55
“Again, that the complexe significabile of this proposition ‘God and creature are 
distinct’ is nothing.—This is false and scandalous.”
(51) A dam  W odeh am  (1977), 76.
(52) This point seems to have been missed by T achau  (1988), 355, who gives the 
impression that Chatton’s (and Autrecourt’s) view on the signification of contradictories is 
peculiar.
(53) N icolaus von  A utrecourt  (1988), 82.
(54) N icolaus von A utrecourt (1988), 94.
(55) N icolaus von A utrecourt (1988), 94.
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The theory of the complexe significabile was one of the views put forth in 
connection with the question of the nature of the object of knowledge that is 
acquired in scientia demonstrativa. Alternative answers to this question, were 
that the object of knowledge is a proposition (complexum) or that it is a res in 
the outside w orld.56
A fundamental problem with which the theory of the complexe significabile 
had to cope was the ontological status of the complexe significabile: is it a 
thing (aliquid) or nothing (nihil)1 It is within the context of this discussion 
that an interpretation of articles 31, 57 and 58 will prove to be most fruitful.
According article 58, Autrecourt had held the view that the complexe 
significabile o f the proposition “Deus et creatura distinguntur” is nothing 
(nihil). To my mind, this article should be read as a straightforward rejection 
of complexe significabilia. From  the two options—whether a complexe 
significabile is something (aliquid) or nothing (nihil)—Autrecourt has chosen 
the second one.57
There are several medieval texts on the complexe significabile that clearly 
present this aliquid-nihil dilemma. Here I will draw particular attention to the 
Sophismata of John Buridan, a notorious adversary of the complexe 
significabile. In the fifth sophism of the first chapter Buridan puts forward a 
number of arguments that eventually lead him to the conclusion that complexe 
significabilia are nihil:
“Item omne quod est, Deus est vel creatura dependens a Deo. Et tamen ilia 
complexe significabilia non erant creatura, quia erant antequam aliquid Deus 
crearet. Nec erant Deus ut illi dicunt. Et verum est, quia talia sunt multa ut decem 
aut multo plura. Deus autem est unus; ergo omnino nihil erant huiusmodi complexe 
significabilia. ”58
(56) See N uchelm ans (1982), esp. 204-207 and the literature there cited and T achau  (1987) 
on the Wodeham-Chatton debate over the complexe significabile.
(57) PAQufc (1970), 221 has also thought along these lines, but became confused by the fact 
that not the complexe significabile as such, but only the complexe significabile o f a particular 
proposition—i.e. “Deus et creatura distinguntur”—was rejected by Autrecourt. See, however, 
below for an interpretation of the function of this proposition.
(58) John Buridan, Sophismata (1977), 24. In the beginning o f  this Sophism it is explained 
why there have been complexe significabilia before creation: (p. 23) “Probatur conclusio quod 
complexe significabilia sunt, quia antequam aliquid esset praeter Deum, multa complexe 
significabilia erant. H oc probatur, quia hom o non currebat tunc, ergo ita erat quod homo non 
currebat...” Other texts that present the aliquid-nihil dilemma, are A dam W odeham (1978), 
87 par. 54: “Item, quidquid tu posueris eius obiectum totale, illud aut est aliquid aut nihiT'. 
The obiectum totale o f  a proposition, according to W odeham, is: (p. 87) “eius significatum; 
eius autem significatum est sic esse vel sic non esse sicut per propositionem denotatur.” 
G regory o f  R imini, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum (1979-1984), I prol. 
q. 1,9 : “Nunc ad argumentum, cum quaeritur, utrum illud totale significatum sit aliquid vel 
nihil, dico quod si ‘aliquid’ sumatur primo vel secundo m odo, est aliquid; si vero tertio m odo  
sumatur, non est aliquid.” The interpretation o f  article 58 has also been the subject o f  
medieval discussion, for example in the Commentaries on the Sentences of Andreas de N ovo  
Castro and o f  Bonsembiante. Their remarks, however, are not very helpful to an 
understanding o f  the historical background o f  Autrecourts’ condemnation. They skillfully 
employ the article in order to bring home their own philosophical point. See Elie (1937), 86, 
97-98 and 144-145 for a translation o f  the relevant passages.
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The proposition “Deus et creatura distinguntur” serves as a provocative 
example. Provocative, because, as can be gathered from the passage quoted 
above, Buridan exactly reproaches adherents to the complexe significabile with 
not distinguishing between God and creature. Autrecourt could have made 
the same point with any other proposition, and then this article probably 
would not have been condemned. The “scandalous” aspect for the careless 
reader seems to have been that the article creates the impression that the 
proposition “Deus et creatura distinguntur” does not signify anything. Even a 
term like “chimera” , however, does have a signification, let alone terms like 
“G od” or “creature” . 59
For the sake of completeness I have to point out that the condemnation of 
this particular article also allows another, though somewhat perverse, 
interpretation. Secundum imaginationem, so to speak, one could assume that 
the reason why Autrecourt was castigated for qualifying the complexe 
significabile as a non-entity was that the persons who were responsible for 
Autrecourt’s condemnation were all adherents of the theory of the complexe 
significabile. But, as I already remarked, this interpretation may be a bit 
farfetched. For in the literature it is generally assumed that the people who 
were behind A utrecourt’s condemnation, intentionally or unintentionally 
misunderstood most of the theses that were condemned.60 Besides, we do not 
know anything about the views of the commission that was responsible for 
Autrecourt’s condemnation.
For an interpretation of articles 31 and 57, which are almost exactly the 
same, we have to turn again to W odeham’s Question on the complexe 
significabile. Here W odeham discusses certain dubia against his own position, 
one of which reads as follows:
“Item, quidquid tu posueris eius obiectum to tale, illud aut est aliquid aut nihil. Si 
nihil, igitur nihil est obiectum actus assentiendi. Certum est quod falsum est. Si 
aliquid: vel Deus vel creatura. "61
This last sentence presents an exhaustive enumeration: everything that exists, 
is either God or a creature. Or, in the words of John Buridan: “Item, omne 
quod est, Deus est vel creatura dependens a D eo ...”62 
Against this background the theses 31 and 57 may be read as an answer to 
the dubium raised in W odeham’s text. The argumentation would run as
(5 9 ) See for example this conclusion of B u r id a n , Sophismata (1 9 7 7 ) , cap. 1 Sophisma 6 ,2 6 :  
“Quarta conclusio est quod etiam omni voce significativa et actu significante aliquid 
significatur”. The fifth conclusion deals with the signification of terms like “chimera” and 
“vacuum”.
(60) See for example T a c h a u  (1988), 354 and 356 and also N icolaus von A trecourt (1988), 
xxxiv (“Missdeutungen und böswillige Interpretation von Sätzen, die Nicolaus geäussert 
haben soll” .)
(61) A dam  W o deham  (1977), 87 par. 54.
(62) See footnote 58.
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follows: A complexe significabile is a nihil or an aliquid. If  it is an aliquid, it is 
either God or a creature. Whereupon Autrecourt replies: “God and creature 
are not aliquid' (Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid).
In other words, by denying that God and creature are an aliquid, 
Autrecourt rules out one option and is left with the other one: that is to say, 
the option that a complexe significabile is nihil. This interpretation is consistent 
with article 58, which, as we have seen, in a more explicit way states that a 
complexe significabile is nothing.63
Given A utrecourt’s stance with regard to the complexe significabile, one 
may still wonder how he came to maintain the thesis “Deus et creatura non 
sunt aliquid’?  The reason is, I think, purely grammatical. A part from the 
content of this thesis, and apart from the stance one takes with regard to the 
debate on the complexe significabile, the thesis “Deus et creatura non sunt 
aliquid” is false on purely grammatical grounds: "aliquid” is singular, whereas 
“Deus et creatura” are plural. They are alique, so to speak.
That these grammatical considerations could indeed play a role in 14th- 
century argumentations is nicely illustrated by the following two passages. 
The first one is taken from Buridan, the second one from Ockham.
"... Sed tunc manifestum est quod ita non est vera ‘Deus et multa alia est melius 
quam Deus’, quia oratio est incongrua; ideo neque vera neque falsa. Et si dicatur 
non quod ‘est’ sed quod ‘sunt’, dico quod ‘Deus et multa alia sunt melius quam 
Deus’ adhuc propositio est falsa, quia non sunt aliquid: ideo non sunt melius. Et si 
dicatur 'sunt meliora’, adhuc possit dici quod comparatio esset abusiva, quia Deus 
non est plura bona sed unicum bonum.,,(A
The quotation from Ockham makes it clear that this “merely grammatical” 
argument has a deeper background. The passage I am quoting occurs in the 
context of Ockham’s discussion of whether all the grammatical properties 
(accidentia grammaticalia) that are common to spoken and written nouns are 
also common to mental nouns. Ockham believes that only case and number 
are proper to both vocal and mental terms:
(63) T ac ha u  (1988), 354-355 has been the first to link Autrecourt’s articles to Wodeham’s 
Question and she is right in maintaining that Autrecourt’s position is not Wodeham’s. 
Nevertheless, I think that she has partly misunderstood Autrecourt’s position. Like Buridan, 
Autrecourt is straightforwardly rejecting complexe significabilia as reified logical construc­
tions. They are nothing (nihil). Furthermore I do not think that articles 31 and 57 can be 
read as a modification of Wodeham’s position on the complexe significabile to the extent that 
these articles show that Autrecourt “allows signification by the constituents of propositions 
(in this case, their subject, even if compound), rather than reserving it to the propositions 
themselves” (p. 355). When it is a quest of complexe significabilia the main point is exactly— 
nomen est omen—that something can only be signified by a proposition which has affirmative 
or negative force, N uchelm ans (1982), 204. So, it makes no sense to talk about the complexe 
significabile o f “Deus et creatura” in the proposition “Deus et creatura distinguntur’’ as 
T ac ha u  (1988), 354 suggests.
(64) Jo hn  B u r id a n , Quaestiones super libros Physicorum (1509), VIII q. 3, f. 112rb. The 
passage has also been cited by P a q u£ (1970), 230-231, although there in connection with his 
interpretation of the Statute of the Arts Faculty of Paris of December 1340.
170 J. M. M. H. THIJSSEN
“Sicut enim istae propositiones vocales ‘homo est animal’, ‘homo non est animalia’ 
distincta habent predicata quorum unum est numeri singularis et aliud pluralis, ita 
propositiones mentales quarum una mens ante omnem vocem dicit quod homo est 
animal et alia dicit quod homo non est animalia distincta habent predicata quorum 
unum potest dici numeri singularis et aliud pluralis... Sed certe, cuius numeri vel 
casus sit subiectum vel predicatum, ad sciendum an propositio sit vera vel falsa 
oportet aspicere. Haec enim est vera ‘homo est animal’ et haec falsa ‘homo est 
animalia’ et sic de aliis.”65
Thus, in sum, grammatically unsound sentences are false. If  one links this 
view to the dubium in W odeham’s text cited above—si aliquid vel Deus vel 
creatura—the purport o f A utrecourt’s thesis seems to be that one cannot even 
state the question of the ontological status of the com plexe significabile in 
this way on the grammatical ground that Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid.
Finally, one has to ask how articles 31 and 57 came to be qualified, or 
perhaps better disqualified, as “falsam et scandalosam prout verba sonant” and 
“falsum et scandalosum prout iacet” respectively?66
It is my guess that the Statute o f December 1340 of the Arts-faculty of Paris 
was at the base of the condemnation of these two articles. The following 
section of the Statute has a bearing upon A utrecourt’s articles:
“Item quod nullus asserat absque distinctione vel expositione, quod Socrates et 
Plato, vel Deus et creatura nichil sunt, quoniam verba prima facie male sonant, et 
quia talis propositio sensum unum habet falsum, videlicet si negatio in hac dictione 
‘nichil’ implicita intelligeret cadere non solum super ens singulariter, sed et super 
entia pluraliter.”61
If  one conjectures that A utrecourt’s thesis “Deus et creatura non sunt 
aliquid” has been misconstrued by his judges as “Deus et creatura sunt nihil” 
then the articles and the Statute run strikingly parallel. The Statute gives two 
reasons why one should not maintain a proposition like “Deus et creatura sunt 
nihil”\ 1) the proposition sounds somehow wrong; and 2) it is false. These two 
reasons are exactly captured in the qualifications of the articles as scandalosam 
prout verba sonant I scandalosum prout iacet and falsum  respectively.
The Statute explains why the proposition “Deus et creatura nihil sunt” is 
false. This thesis is false on grammatical grounds! W ithout further explanation 
of this thesis it would seem as if the term nihil not only refers to ens 
singulariter (in which case the proposition would be true), but also to entia 
pluraliter (in which case the proposition would be false). The reading 
according to which nihil is understood to imply ens singulariter can be 
reconstructed as follows: “Deus et creatura non sunt ens”. This proposition is 
true, because “Deus et creatura” is plural, whereas ens is singular. If, however, 
nihil is understood to imply entia pluraliter, the proposition “Deus et creatura
(65) W ill ia m  o f  O ck h am , Summa logicae (1974), pars I cap. 3, esp. 12-13.
(66) The German translation of “prout iacet” as “wie klar ist” in N ic o la u s  v o n  
A u t r e c o u r t  (1988), 57 is not correct.
(67) D enifle/C h atelain  (1889), II n . 1042, 505-507.
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non sunt entia” is false for the obvious reason that God and creature are 
beings (entia).™
The statute also explains why the articles 31 and 57 deserve the qualification 
“scandalosam prout verba sonant” and “scandalosum prout iacet”. Although 
the proposition “Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid” is ill-sounding, when taken 
at its face-value, Autrecourt nevertheless omitted a proper explanation of it.
In sum, it is very likely that the condemnation of articles 31 and 57 in 1346 
was induced by the Statute of the Faculty of Arts o f December 1340: both 
articles were condemned because o f the existence of the 1340 Statute. This is 
perhaps an unusual presentation of the events, for it is generally assumed— 
without sufficient proof—that the articles 31 and 57 identify Nicholas as one 
of those condemned by the 1340 Statute.69 In any case, articles 30, 31, 35, 57 
and 58 take on—in the interpretation that I have proposed here—a coherent 
and consistent stance with regard to the theory of the complexe significabile.
Epilogue.
Taking for granted the interpretation of the “semantic” articles presented 
above, one is finally left with the difficult task of at least attempting to explain 
why Autrecourt’s opinions have evoked the scorn of Church-authorities to 
such an extent that he had to recant them in public.
The list of condemned articles does not furnish us with the grounds on 
which A utrecourt’s theses were attacked. Perhaps the censuring of heresy was 
of some concern to the papal commission that was responsible for reviewing 
Autrecourt’s opinions, but in general Autrecourt’s list rather gives the 
impression that the condemnation was inspired by a zeal to ban teachings that 
were regarded philosophically or theologically offensive.70 This seems to be 
especially true for the “ semantic” theses that have been discussed here. None 
of these theses was condemned as “hereticum”, and in only one case— 
article 1— there are really strong indications for a theological connection.
The motivations behind A utrecourt’s condemnation are neither explained 
in the letter that Pope Clement VI sent to the masters and scholars of the
(68) A  “grammatical” interpretation o f  this section o f  the Statute has also been advanced 
by Paqu£ (1970), 227. His interpretation is not correct, however. Paque seems to think that 
the Statute refers to a kind o f dm siojcom positio  distinction: without further explanation it 
would seem as if  the term nihil not only refers to each part separately (i.e. the singular “G od” 
or the singular “creature”), but also to the com pound as a whole (i.e. the plural “G od and 
creature”). Tachau’s reading o f the Statute, quoted above, is also wrong. She assumes that the 
false sense arises when nihil refers to each part o f  the proposition separately (i.e. in sensus 
divisus so to speak), Tachau (1988), 355.
(69) M o o d y  (1975), 138-139, P a q u £  (1970), 196 and 242-243, B o t t in  (1982), 192-193 and 
perhaps also T a c h a u  (1988), 351.
(70) Twenty-five out o f  the sixty-three articles received the predicate “hereticum” (9, 16, 
17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 38, 39, 43 till 54). The other articles were qualified as 
“falsum”, “erroneum” , “revocandum”, “scandalosum” or a combination o f  these.
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university of Paris shortly after Autrecourt’s condemnation in 1346. By 
remaining silent on this point, in a way the letter confirms the impression that 
Autrecourt was not attacked for any specific heresy. The letter is phrased in 
rather general terms. Clement complains that the theologians are spending 
their time on philosophical questions, peculiar disputations, suspect opinions 
and strange doctrines, instead of on the Bible, the Saints and the expositions 
of the doctors.71
A very stimulating and attractive hypothesis as to the broader historical 
context of A utrecourt’s condemnation has recently been put forward by 
Tachau. She has suggested that Autrecourt’s condemnation was induced by 
the misunderstanding of and the resistence against the “new English 
theology” that was introduced at Paris.72
Tachau has been able to adduce a wealth of material in support of her 
thesis, especially with regard to the doctrine of the complexe significabile and 
A utrecourt’s intellectual debt on this point to Adam Wodeham.
Against this background it sounds plausible that part of A utrecourt’s 
difficulties indeed did stem from his preoccupation with “ strange doctrines” 
like the complexe significabile. And it is also not to be ruled out that 
A utrecourt’s thought on the complexe significabile reveals an intellectual debt 
to Wodeham. My own use of W odeham’s text in attempting to reconstruct 
A utrecourt’s views, may even seem to corroborate this last point.
On the other hand, one should pay attention to the fact that Autrecourt 
himself—if my interpretations are right—had been a determined adversary of 
the theory of the complexe significabile.73 This complicates an account of 
Autrecourt’s condemnation, unless one assumes that the judges had 
misunderstood Autrecourt.
(71) D enifle/C hatelain (1889), I, no. 1125, 588: “ ...Plerique quoque theologi, quod 
deflendum est amarius, de textu Biblie, originalibus et dictis sanctorum ac doctorum 
expositionibus (...) non curantes, philosophicis questionibus et aliis curiosis disputationibus et 
suspectis opinionibus doctrinisque peregrinis et variis se involvunt, non verentes in illis 
expendere dies suos, que nec domi nec milite nec alicubi prosunt, et omissis necessariis 
supervacua docere et dicere satagunt in tanta temporis egestate, sic quod, unde deberent 
prodire fructus uberes sicut antiquitus reficientes fideles delectabiliter ad salutem, pestifera 
pululant quandoque semina, et in perniciosam segetem, de quo profecto dolendum est, 
coalescunt...” T achau  (1988), 379 also thinks that Clement’s letter allows us to infer 
something of the nature o f Autrecourt’s difficulties. Note, however, that Clement’s complaint 
with regard to the “philosophical disputations”, “sophistications” and “the new doctrines 
that are reportedly taught at other universities” (Tachau’s paraphrases) are taken from that 
section of Clement’s letter that deals with the arts-faculty! So, it is a bit difficult to see how 
this relates to the theologian Autrecourt.
(72) T ac ha u  (1988), esp. 353-357 and 377-383. In spite of my few critical remarks with 
regard to Tachau’s hypothesis, she should be credited for being one of the very few who has 
attempted to put Autrecourt’s condemnation into its broader historical intellectual 
framework.
(73) My interpretation on this point differs from the one proposed by T ac ha u  (1988), 355, 
who presents Autrecourt’s position as a modification o f Wodeham’s.
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Further, one should be careful not to get entangled in a post quern, propter 
quem argumentation. More than fifty years ago Elie uncovered the Parisian 
theologian Gregory of Rimini as the first thinker to hold the doctrine of the 
complexe significabile, and on this ground assumed that Autrecourt’s 
condemnation on this point was linked to Gregory of Rimini’s views.74 In the 
seventies, Gài uncovered the English theologian Adam Wodeham as an even 
earlier proponent of the theory of the complexe significabile.7S We should not 
make the same mistake again by assuming, without further proof, that 
A utrecourt’s recanted positions show the influence of W odeham.76 Perhaps 
other adherents of the theory of the complexe significabile—French or 
English?—before Wodeham might be discovered. The dubia that Wodeham 
deals with in his text could be an indication of an ongoing discussion.77 Also 
the availability of W odeham’s works in Paris and the dating of A utrecourt’s 
works have still not been settled.78 Perhaps it will turn out that Elie had been 
right after all and that A utrecourt’s articles reflect discussions of the opinions 
of Gregory of Rimini, rather than of those of W odeham.79
J. M. M. H. T h ij s s e n .
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